Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

Juanita Taft Rogers v. Real Estate Division,
Department of Business Regulations, State of Utah
: Brief of Petitioner
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary H. Weight; Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin; Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Sheila Page; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Rogers v. The Division of Real Estate, No. 890021 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1525

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
'J f>'<',*.

r

29-1221

L

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JUANITA TAFT ROGERS,
Petitionar-Appellant,

Case No. 890021-CA
RE87-08-02

vs.
REAL ESTATE DIVISION,
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS
REGULATIONS, STATE OF UTAH,
Category No. 14a
Respondent.
BRIEF OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM A RECOMMENDED ORDER OF
BROKER'S LICENSE, BEFORE THE REAL
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATIONS
J. STEVEN EKLUND, ADMINISTRATIVE

REVOCATION OF PRINCIPAL
ESTATE DIVISION OF THE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
LAW JUDGE, PRESIDING

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
SHEILA PAGE
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

GARY H. WEIGHT
ALDRICH,- NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
43 East 200 North
P. 0. Box "L"
Provo, Utah 84603-0200

Attorney for Respondent

Attorney for Appellant

i

*~D

liasa SLats

n»<2i 1989
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JUANITA TAFT ROGERS,
Petitioner-Appellant,

Case No. 890021-CA
RE87-08-02

vs.
REAL ESTATE DIVISION,
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS
REGULATIONS, STATE OF UTAH,
Category No. 14a
Respondent.
BRIEF OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM A RECOMMENDED ORDER OF
BROKER'S LICENSE, BEFORE THE REAL
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATIONS
J. STEVEN EKLUND, ADMINISTRATIVE

REVOCATION OF PRINCIPAL
ESTATE DIVISION OF THE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
LAW JUDGE, PRESIDING

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
SHEILA PAGE
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

GARY H. WEIGHT
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
43 East 200 North
P. 0. Box "L"
Provo, Utah 84603-0200

Attorney for Respondent

Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities

ii

Statement of Jurisdiction

1

Nature of Proceedings

1

Statement of Issues

1

Statutes

2

Statement of the Case

2

Summary of Argument

6

POINT I

8

THE PETITION OF THE REAL ESTATE DIVISION DATED
NOVEMBER 25, 1987, SEEKING TO SUSPEND OR REVOKE
THE LICENSE OF PETITIONER JUANITA TAFT ROGERS IS
BARRED BY LATCHES OR THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
POINT II

12

REVOCATION OF THE PRINCIPAL BROKERS LICENSE OF
JUANITA TAFT ROGERS IS UNDULY HARSH AND INEQUITABLE.
Conclusion

15

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
Section 61-2-11, Utah Code Annotated
Section 61-2-12(1)(f), Utah Code Annotated

2
1,2

Section 63-46-(b)l6, Utah Code Annotated

1

Section 78-12-1, Utah Code Annotated

9

Section 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated

10

Section 78-12-25(2), Utah Code Annotated
Section 78-12-33, Utah Code Annotated

10,11,15
9

CASES
Branting v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296; 153 P. 995 (1915) . . 10
Holm v. B & M Service, 661 P. 2d 951 (Utah 1983)

ii

10

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JUANITA TAFT ROGERS,

:
:

Case No. 890021-CA
RE87-08-02

Petitioner-Appellant,
VS.

1

REAL ESTATE DIVISION,
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS
REGULATIONS, STATE OF UTAH,

:
:
:
:

Category No. 14a

Respondent.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Section 63-46(b)-l6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This

is

a Petition

for

Review

of

Findings

of

Fact,

C o n c l u s i o n s of Law and a Recommended Order wherein J.

Steven

Eklund, Administrative Law Judge, recommended the revocation of
petitioner's

Principal

Broker's License c o n s i s t e n t

provisions of S e c t i o n 6 1 - 2 - 1 2 ( 1 ) ( f ) .
dated December 14, 1988.

with t h e

The recommendation was

A P e t i t i o n for Review was f i l e d by the

p e t i t i o n e r on January 12, 1989.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I.

Did t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e

Law Judge

err

p e t i t i o n e r ' s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of the

in

denying

respondent,

which Motion asserted t h a t the respondent's action was barred by
1

the Statute of Limitations?
II.

Is there sufficient evidence to sustain the Conclusions

of Law and Order of the Administrative Law Judge?
III.

Is the recommendation of the Administrative Law Judge

inequitable and harsh under the circumstances of this case?
STATUTES
Section 61-2-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
Section 61-2-12(1)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
Rule 9(a)(7), Rules of Real Estate Commission.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a Petition for Review of a ruling by J. Steven
Eklund, Administrative Law Judge wherein petitioner's Principal
Real Estate Broker's License was revoked.
initiated

The action

was

by the Real Estate Division in a Petition dated

November 25, 1987, as Case No. RE87-08-02.

On June 13, 1988,

petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon a claim that the
action of the Real Estate Commission was barred by the Statute of
Limitations.

Said motion was denied and the matter was set for

hearing on September 20, 1988.
The following are the facts found by the Administrative Law
Judge on or after the September 20, 1988 hearing.
1. Sometime in 1973, Respondent became licensed
as a sales agent by the Division of Real Estate.
relevant herein, Respondent was affiliated with
principal broker David R. Harman as of January 1982.
On September 1, 1982, she terminated her affiliation
with Mr. Harman and became affiliated with principal
2

As

broker A. J. Michaels. In late 1982 or early 1983,
she terminated her affiliation with Mr. Michaels and
became affiliated with K. M. Woolley & Company.
2.
By Order, dated August 17, 1983, Respondent's
license was suspended for one year and thereafter
placed on probation for two years, subject to certain
terms and conditions. Said order was based on conduct
which occurred between December 10, 1981 and August 22,
1982. Respondent's conduct in that regard was found to
constitute gross incompetence and a violation of the
fiduciary duty owed to her clients in that transaction.
Respondent subsequently became licensed as a principal
broker on January 15, 1987.
3.
In January, 1982, a Barbara Homeyer contacted
Respondent to obtain her services in purchasing a home.
Ms. Homeyer, who was recently divorced, resided in a
home jointly owned by herself and her ex-husband.
Since there had been no property settlement relative
to her divorce and Ms. Homeyerfs ex-husband was
reluctant to cooperate as to the sale of their home,
the only assets available to Ms. Homeyer to provide a
down payment on the purchase of another home consisted
of various items of inherited personal property.
4. During January 1982, Ms. Homeyer and Respondent
entered into a verbal agreement, whereby Respondent
was to act as Ms. Homeyer's real estate agent and
attempt to find a prospective seller who would accept
Ms. Homeyerfs personal property as down payment for the
purchase of a home. On February 21, 1982, respondent
and Ms. Homeyer inventoried her property. Ms. Homeyer
then delivered that property to respondent, which was
held in storage under respondent's control. The
property was so transferred to respondent as the means
to provide a safe place for its storage and facilitate
respondent's access to that property if a prospective
seller was located.
5.
Between February and late-April 1 9 8 2 ,
respondent and Ms. Homeyer identified at least two
properties for possible purchase. In one instance, an
agreement could not be reached as to those items of Ms.
Homeyer's personal property which would be acceptable
in lieu of a cash down payment.
When it became
apparent to Ms. Homeyer that no other purchase on the
above-described terms would be realized, she authorized
respondent to sell certain items as the means to
provide cash for the down payment necessary to purchase
a home.
6.
During March and April 1982, respondent had

3

some of Ms. Homeyerfs property appraised and certain
items were sold in antique shows.
However, as of late
April 1982, no progress in locating a suitable home had
been realized, Ms. Homeyer had received no monies from
respondent relative to the sale of some of her property
and respondent had taken certain property from storage
and sold it without Ms. Homeyerfs authorization.
Further, respondent never advised her principal broker
of her activities nor did she deliver to him any of the
funds she obtained from the sale of Ms. Homeyer Ts
property.
7. In late-April or early May 1982, Ms. Homeyer
underwent foot surgery and was advised that her
condition could be cancerous. At the time, it was
unknown if a suitable home would be found and whether
that would occur prior to her possible death. On May
5, 1982, Ms. Homeyer met with respondent and they
executed a written agreement, whereby the former
assigned all of her personal property to respondent for
sale and/or exchange and authorized respondent to
liquidate that property.
The agreement further
provided that if all property held by respondent was
not liquidated prior to Ms. Homeyer f s death, the
remaining funds would be placed in trust for the
benefit of her two minor children.
8. During the next two months, Ms. Homeyer was
never advised as to the status of her property and was
unable to contact respondent in that regard. In midJuly 1982, Ms. Homeyer retained counsel and made
written demand that respondent return all personal
property in her possession and provide an accounting as
to the sale or other disposition of the remaining
property which had been in her possession.
9. By letter, dated October 21, 1982, respondent
generally informed Ms. Homeyer as to efforts which had
been undertaken to appraise, restore, and/or sell some
of the property in her possession. Respondent further
mentioned various costs incurred as to the appraisal
and restoration of that property. Respondent also
reiterated that her efforts had been undertaken to
produce funds necessary for a down payment for a home
or condominium, but she acknowledged that no suitable
residence had yet been identified.
Respondent
requested Ms. Homeyer to keep her posted "about what
you want to do with the housing thing" and she advised
Ms. Homeyer of a listing for a two bedroom townhouse
duplex and pondered that Ms. Homeyer could live in one
side and rent the other.
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10.
By letter, dated October 28, 1982, Ms.
Homeyer advised respondent that purchase of the duplex
would not be economically feasible and reiterated that
no accounting had been received as to the status of her
property or any disposition thereof. By letter, dated
October 29, 1982, a second demand was made that
respondent return all items of personal property
entrusted to her. When compliance with that demand was
not forthcoming, Ms. Homeyer initiated litigation. No
accounting was provided to Ms. Homeyer until July 9,
1986, when respondent returned certain items pursuant
to a writ of replevin.
11. By stipulation, dated October 7, 1986, Ms.
Horaeyer and respondent identified the status of some of
the property which had been in respondent's possession.
That property consisted of guns, cameras, furs, clocks
and watches, a coin collection, silver, jewelry,
flatware, china, pewter, furniture, household and other
miscellaneous items. The value of the property which
respondent sold was agreed to have been $6,530.50 and
respondent received $4,495.00 from the sale of that
property. It was agreed that certain property, valued
at $6,799.50, was delivered by respondent to third
parties and that said property had not been recovered
by Ms. Horaeyer.
It was also agreed that certain
property still in respondent's possession should be
valued at $4,820.50.
12.
Some of the property which Ms. Homeyer had
delivered to respondent was subsequently returned to
her. However, in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, dated October 30, 1986, the Court concluded that
respondent had sold some of the property below fair
market value, had interfered with Ms. Horaeyer's
possession and control of some of the property by
intentionally refusing to return it and had converted
the proceeds from the sale of some of the property to
her own use. By reason thereof, the Court entered
judgment on October 30, 1986 in favor of Ms. Homeyer
totaling $2,035.50 as a result of respondent's breach
of contractual and fiduciary duties to Ms. Homeyer,
$4,495.00 as a result of respondent's conversion of
proceeds from the sale of the property, $6,799.50 as a
result of respondent's conversion of property upon
transferring that property to others and $4,820.50 as a
result of respondent's conversion of property still in
her possession.
13. In the above-referenced Findings of FAct, the
court also noted that Ms. Homeyer had initiated

5

bankruptcy proceedings on July 22, 1985 and that
respondent had been listed as a creditor in said
proceedings* The Court further noted that an order was
entered in those proceedings on October 30, 1985,
whereby Ms. Horaeyer was discharged of all claims,
including those of respondent relative to expenses she
incurred in her efforts to repair, restore and dispose
of Ms. Homeyer's property. The instant record also
reflects that respondent initiated bankruptcy
proceedings in 1981 and that after entry of the October
30, 1986 judgment, an order was entered in those
bankruptcy proceedings relative to respondent, whereby
the just-stated judgment was discharged.
After hearing the case on September 20, 1988, Judge J.
Steven Eklund concluded that petitioner had entered into and
remained

in a real estate

transaction

and

contractual

relationship with Barbara Homeyer and that her conduct during the
term of the contract, which terminated in the late fall of 1982,
constituted a violation of the provisions of the Real Estate
Licensure Act and the Rules propounded to enforce the act.

Judge

Eklund recommended and ordered revocation of petitioner's real
estate license.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On November 25, 1987, a Petition to revoke the principal
broker's license of Juanita Taft Rogers was filed.

The petition

alleged acts of Rogers which occurred more than five (5) years
previously.

This Court should enforce a Statute of Limitations,

against the Real Estate Division and should reverse the decision
of the Administrative Law Judge to deny petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss based upon the Statute of Limitations.
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All the actions

complained of by the Real Estate Commission against Juanita Taft
Rogers relate to events which occurred in the year 1982 or
earlier.

After a period of suspension, petitioner, Juanita Taft

Rogers, applied for and received from the Real Estate Division a
principal broker's license and has practiced in the field of real
estate sales without any suggestion of a threat to the interests
of the public at large.

The two real estate transactions, if

they were real estate transactions for which the petitioner
either was suspended or is presently subject to revocation were
bizarre, unusual and unique in the real estate field and were
handled reasonably by petitioner.
and activities as a principal

Petitioner's present actions
real estate broker do not

constitute a danger to the public at large and she is capable and
competent to continue in the real estate practice.

Revocation

of her license is much to harsh.
The May 5, 1982 agreement between petitioner and Barbara
Horaeyer constituted a new agreement for services unrelated to the
real estate field and was simply an authorization and agreement
for petitioner to act as a liquidator of property of Barbara
Homeyer.

The Court erred in construing the May 5, 1982 agreement

as a real estate contract, listing agreement or otherwise.

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PETITION OF THE REAL ESTATE DIVISION DATED NOVEMBER 25, 1987,
SEEKING TO SUSPEND OR REVOKE THE LICENSE OF PETITIONER JUANITA
TAFT ROGERS IS BARRED BY LATCHES OR THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The action brought by the Real Estate Division against the
principal broker's license of Juanita Taft Rogers is in its
nature "civil."
states:
action.'"

Rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

"There shall be one form of action to be known as

civil

The words "civil action" are defined in general as:

An action wherein an issue is presented for trial
formed by averments of complaint and denials of answer
or replication to new matter, White v. White, 98 Ind.
App. 587, 186 N.E. 349; an adversary proceeding for
declaration, enforcement or protection of a right,
redress, or prevention of a wrong, People v. Barker, 29
Cal. App. 2d Supp. 766, 77 P.2d 321 ; Lee v. LangT 140
Fla. 782, 192 S.O. 490; Johnston v. State, 212 Ind.
375, 8 N.E. 590. Every action other than a criminal
action, City of Neena v. Krueger, 206 Wis. 473, 240
N.W. 402. Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Ed.
1968.
In the civil law, a civil action is a personal action which
is instituted to compel payment, or the doing of some other thing
which is purely civil.

At common law, a civil action is one

which seeks the establishment, recovery, or redress of private
and civil rights.

It is an action brought to recover some civil

right, or to obtain redress for some wrong not deemed a crime or
misdemeanor.

Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Ed. 1968.

Clearly the kind of action brought by the Real Estate
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Division against the principal broker's license of Juanita Taft
Rogers can be characterized as "civil."

Section 78-12-1, Utah

Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, is the codification of the
Statute of Limitations for the State of Utah and States as
follows:
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action
has accrued, except in specific cases where a different
limitation is prescribed by statute*
Section 61-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
contain the provisions of law adopted in the State of Utah
regulating
Division.

the Securities Commission and the Real Estate
Nowhere in Section 61-1 of the Utah Code is there

located a separate Statute of Limitations clause pertaining to
affairs or enforcements efforts of the Real Estate Division.

On

the other hand, actions brought in the name of or for the benefit
of the State are subject to the provisions of Section 78-12 et
seq., Utah Code Annotated.

Specifically, Section 78-12-33

provides:
The limitations prescribed in this article shall apply
to actions brought in the name of or for the benefit of
the State in the same manner as to actions by private
parties.
Thus, unless the real estate statutes under Title 61 Chapter
1 provide for a different period of limitation or make provision
in some regard with respect to the limitations of actions by the
Real Estate Division, then the provisions of Title 78, Chapter 12
9

prescribe the appropriate limitation of actions controlling the
Real Estate Division.

In that regard, Section 78-12-25 provides

as follows:
Within four years:
... (2)
An action for relief not otherwise
provided for by law.
The Utah Supreme Court has construed sub-section 2 of 78-1225 to apply to al actions, legal or equitable where plaintiff
seeks affirmative relief.
296, 153 P. 995 (1915).

Branting v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah

The Supreme Court has also stated that

the Statute of Limitation under 78-12-25(2) provides a catch-all
provision for actions not otherwise provided for by law. Holm v.
B. & M. Service, Inc., 661 P.2d 951 (Utah 1983).

This provision

of the Statute of Limitation provides the longest period of
limitation

within

which

the Real

conceivably bring its action.

Estate

Division

could

All other applicable provisions of

the statute of limitations are shorter than the four (4) years.
The longer limitation periods prescribed in Title 78, Chapter 12
have no application to the action being taken by the real estate
division against the principal broker's license of petitioner
Juanita Taft Rogers.

A thorough reading of all of the other

chapters contained in Title 78 of the Utah Code will disclose
that there is not a specific provision describing a licensure
revocation such as the one brought here by the real estate
division.

Thus, such action by the Real Estate Division clearly
10

falls within the provisions of the catch-all limitation as set
forth in Section 78-12-25(2).

That being the case, the Division

of Real Estate was more than a year beyond the Statute of
Limitations when it filed

its petition

for revocation or

suspension of the principal broker's license of Juanita Taft
Rogers.

Accordingly said petition should have been dismissed

and the action barred when the matter was addressed pursuant to
petitioner Rogers motion to dismiss filed herein.
A reading of the November 25, 1987 petition filed by the
Real Estate Division discloses that all of the acts alleged to
have been committed by Juanita Taft Rogers giving rights to a
revocation or suspension of her license occurred before November
of 1982, some five (5) years before the Real Estate Division
filed

its action.

Administrative

The

Findings

of Fact

adopted

by the

Law Judge at the adjudicative hearing also

disclosed that all complained of actions of Juanita Taft Rogers
occurred before November of 1982.

Thus, petitioner, Juanita Taft

Rogers respectfully moves this Court to enter an order reversing
the ruling of the adjudicative hearing judge wherein he denied
petitionees Motion to Dismiss.

Petitioner further moves this

court to remand this matter to the Division of Real Estate with
instructions to dismiss the petition filed against Juanita Taft
Rogers for suspension or revocation of her principal broker's
license.
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POINT II
REVOCATION OF THE PRINCIPAL BROKERS LICENSE OF JUANITA TAFT ROGERS
IS UNDULY HARSH AND INEQUITABLE.
The Administrative Law Judge acknowledged in his Findings of
Fact that Juanita Taft Rogers and Barbara Homeyer entered into a
May 5, 1982 agreement which was written and signed.

A copy of

the agreement is set forth in the Appendix of this brief.
Petitioner, Rogers, believes that Judge Eklund

erroneously

concluded that the May 5, 1982 agreement constituted a continuing
Real Estate agreement.

In the real estate business, when a

broker or salesman enters into contractual relationships either
with a buyer or seller, particularized forms of agreement are
used.

When dealing with a seller, a broker or agent of a broker

traditionally enters into what is known as a "listing agreement."
The "listing agreement" is a specific

raemoralization

of

understanding between the parties authorizing the listing agent
or broker to sell the property for a certain agreed
compensation and for a specific period of time.

upon

When dealing

with a buyer, a broker or sales agent typically and traditionally
prepares for execution what is known as an "earnest money
agreement."

The "earnest money agreement" constitutes an offer

and acceptance between a buyer and seller and sets forth the
general terms anticipated to be incorporated
agreement of sale between the parties.

into a final

The May 5, 1982 agreement

is neither a "listing agreement" or an "earnest money agreement."
12

The May 5, 1982 agreement is solely and exclusively a contract
between Barbara Homeyer and Juanita Taft Rogers authorizing the
later to sell personal property (not real property) of Barbara
Horaeyer and to hold in trust any sale proceeds received after the
death of Barbara Horaeyer in the event she should meet an untimely
death*

Nowhere is there any mention that the proceeds from the

sale of the personal property be utilized as a down payment or
any kind of payment toward a real estate purchase.

There is no

limitation of time as is typical of listing agreements and there
is no commission percentage set forth as is typical of listing
agreements.

Said document was drafted at the instance and in the

presence of Mrs. Homeyer.

The hearing court erroneously reasoned

in its Conclusions of Law that
if it were respondent's (Rogers) intent to effect a
shift in her existing relationship with Mrs. Homeyer,
it was incumbent upon respondent (Rogers) to utilize
language clearly reflective of that intent, particularly
when respondent had come into possession of Mrs. HomeyerTs
property as her agent in a real estate transaction,
respondent had already disposed of some of that property,
and it was anticipated that she would retain possession of
the remaining property with the written authorization to
liquidate it.
The Court concluded

that petitioner, Rogers, was in

violation of one rule adopted by the Real Estate Division.
Rule is Rule 9 (a)(7) which provides:
All consideration received by a salesman in connection
with a real estate transaction which he is engaged on
behalf of his broker shall immediately be delivered by
him to his broker....

13

Said

The Administrative Law Judge also concluded that Mrs* Rogers
owed a fiduciary responsibility to Mrs. Homeyer although there
was no statutory fiduciary responsibility set forth in the rules
or

regulations

of

the

Division

of Real

Estate.

The

Administrative Law Judge acknowledged that there was no evidence
that Juanita Taft Rogers had engaged in any misconduct since
1982.

The Administrative Law Judge finally concluded that the

principal brokerfs license

of Juanita Taft Rogers should be

revoked and entered its recommended order accordingly.

The Order

of the court flies in the face of equity and justice.

Even if

one is to assume and conclude that all of the reasons given by
the Administrative Law Judge in its conclusions of law are
correct, an order of revocation of a principal broker's license
cannot be viewed as anything but unreasonable, unjust
inequitable.

and

Not one instance of improper conduct, impropriety,

threat to the public or otherwise has been cited against Juanita
Taft Rogers in the last seven (7) years.

Assuredly, the Division

of Real Estate has looked closely and has investigated the
background of Mrs. Rogers and particularly her transactions as a
Real Estate Broker or agent to determine whether or not any such
impropriety exists.

Nothing has been found.

fact, nothing is to be found.

As a matter of

To allow a long period of time to

pass during which no acts of impropriety are committed, but, on
the other hand, professional responsibility has been discharged,
14

and then allow a license revocation for acts which have long
since passed is on its face, inequitable and unduly harsh.

Thus,

Petitioner Rogers respectfully moves this court to reverse the
revocation of her principal broker's license and remand the
matter to the Division of Real Estate with instructions to either
dismiss the proceedings or to impose alternative sanctions of
much less severity.

CONCLUSION
The Division of Real Estate is barred by the Statute of
Limitations contained within Section 78-12-25(2)
Annotated, as amended.

Utah Code

More than five years lapsed from the time

of any unlawful acts committed by petitioner Rogers to the time
that the division of real estate filed its petition for license
revocation.

Because the acts complained of by the Division of

Real Estate against petitioner Rogers occurred more than five
years before the Petition filed in 1987 and more than seven years
from this date, it is inequitable and unduly harsh to impose a
license revocation of the principal broker's license of Juanita
Taft Rogers.

It is the position of Petitioner Rogers that the

decision of the Administrative Law Judge should be reversed and

15

that the case be remanded with instructions to dismiss the
Petition and licensure proceedings against Juanita Taft Rogers.
DATED this

ZXQP2— day of March, 1989.

GTS

zz^v

Attorney
orney for/R«
Respondent

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief to Mr. Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney
General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this
7k>&day of March, 1989.
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61-2-10

SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISION

of its political subdivisions, upon, or as a condition of,
the privilege of conducting the business regulated by
this chapter, except t h a t a political subdivision
within the state may charge a business license fee if
the licensee m a i n t a i n s a place of business within the
jurisdiction of the political subdivision. Unless otherwise exempt, each licensee under this chapter is subject to all taxes imposed under Title 59.
1968
61-2-10.

Restriction o n c o m m i s s i o n s — Affiliation w i t h m o r e t h a n o n e broker.
It is unlawful for a n y associate broker or sales
agent to accept valuable consideration for the performance of any of t h e acts specified in this chapter from
any person except t h e principal broker with whom he
is affiliated and licensed. An inactive licensee is not
authorised to conduct real estate transactions until
he becomes affiliated with a licensed principal broker. No sales agent or associate broker may affiliate
with more t h a n one principal broker at the same
time. Except as provided by rule, a principal broker
may not be responsible for more than one real estate
brokerage at the same time.
1967
61-2-11.

R e v o c a t i o n or s u s p e n s i o n of license —
G r o u n d s — S u b p o e n a p o w e r of divi-

sion.
The division may investigate or cause to be investigated the actions of any principal broker, associate
broker, sales agent, prelicensing school, or school instructor licensed or certified by this state, or of any
person who acts in any of those capacities within this
state. The division is empowered to subpoena witnesses, take evidence, and require by subpoena duces
tecum the production of books, papers, contracts,
records, other documents, or information considered
relevant to the investigation. Each failure to respond
to a subpoena is considered as a separate violation of
this chapter. The commission, with the concurrence of
the executive director of the Department of Business
Regulation, may impose a civil penalty in an amount
not to exceed $500 or suspend, revoke, place on probation, or deny issuance or reissuance of any license or
the certification of a prelicensing school or instructor,
if, at any time, the licensee or certificate holder,
whether acting as an agent or on his own account, is
found guilty of:
(1) making any substantial misrepresentation;
(2) making any false promises of a character
likely to influence, persuade, or induce;
(3) pursuing a continued and flagrant course
of misrepresentation, or of making false promises
through agents, sales agents, advertising, or otherwise;
(4) acting for more than one party in a transaction without the knowledge of the other party;
(5) acting as an associate broker or sales agent
while not licensed with a licensed principal broker, representing or attempting to represent a
broker other than the principal broker with
whom he is affiliated, or representing as sales
agent or having a contractual relationship similar to that of sales agent with other than a licensed principal broker;
(6) failing, within a reasonable time, to account for or to remit any monies coming into his
possession which belong to others, or commingling those funds with his own, or diverting those
funds from the purpose for which they were received;
(7) paying or offering to pay valuable consideration, as defined by the commission, to any per-
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son not licensed under this chapter, except that
valuable consideration may be shared with a licensed principal broker of another jurisdiction or
as provided under the Professional Corporation
Act;
(8) being unworthy or incompetent to act as a
principal broker, associate broker, or sales agent
in auch manner as to safeguard the interests of
the public;
(9) failing to voluntarily furnish copies of all
documents to all parties executing the documents;
(10) failing to keep and make available for inspection by the division a record of each transaction, including the names of buyers and sellers,
the identification of the property, the sale price,
any monies received in trust, any agreements or
instructions from buyers or sellers, and any other
information required by rule;
(11) failing to disclose, in writing, in the purchase or sale of property, whether the purchase
or sale is made for himself or for an undisclosed
principal;
(12) conviction of a criminal offense involving
moral turpitude;
(13) advertising the availability of real estate
or the services of a licensee in a false, misleading,
or deceptive manner;
(14) in the case of a principal broker or a licensee who is a branch manager, failing to exercise reasonable supervision over the activities of
his licensees and any unlicensed staff;
(15) violating or disregarding this chapter, an
order of the commission, or the rules adopted by
the commission and the division;
(16) breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to his principal in a real estate transaction;
(17) any other conduct which constitutes dishonest dealing; or
(18) unprofessional conduct as defined by statute or rule.
1968
61-2-12.

Disciplinary action — Judicial r e v i e w .

(1) (a) (i) Before imposing a civil penalty, revoking, suspending, placing on probation, or
denying issuance or reissuance of any license, the division shall give notice to the
licensee and schedule an adjudicative proceeding.
(ii) If the licensee is an active sales agent
or active associate broker, the division shall
inform the principal broker with whom the
licensee is affiliated of the charge and of the
time and place of the hearing.
(iii) If, after the hearing, the commission
determines that any licensee is guilty of a
violation of this chapter, the license shall be
suspended, revoked, or denied reissuance by
written order of the commission in concurrence with the executive director.
(b) If the hearing is delegated by the commission to an administrative law judge, and a ruling
has been issued by the commission and the executive director, the licensee may request reconsideration by filing a written request stating specific grounds upon which relief is requested.
(c) Any applicant or licensee, or person aggrieved, including the complainant, may obtain
judicial review of any adverse ruling, order, or
decision of the executive director and the commission.
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(d) If the applicant or licensee prevails in the
appeal and the court finds that the state action
was undertaken without substantial justification, the court may award reasonable litigation
expenses to the applicant or licensee as provided
under Chapter 27a, Title 78, Small Business
Equal Access to Justice Act
(e) (i) No order, rule, or decision of the executive director and the commission may take
effect until 30 days after the time for appeal
to the court has expired
(u) If an appeal is taken by a licensee, the
division shall stay enforcement of the commission's action in accordance with the provisions of Section 63-46b-18

(f) (I) When the notice of appeal is filed, the
appellant shall file with the notice a $200
bond for costs on appeal, conditioned to secure the payment of costs if the appeal is
dismissed or the judgment affirmed
(n) The appellant shall request of the
court, in writing, within two months after
the issuance of the writ of certiorari, a date
certain for the review hearing Appellant's
failure to comply with the requirements of
this subsection shall result in dismissal of
the appeal with prejudice
(2) The commission and the executive director
shall comply with the procedures and requirements of
Chapter 46b, Title 63, in their adjudicative proceedings
1968
61-2-13. Grounds for revocation of principal
broker's
license
—
Automatic
inactivation of affiliated associate brokers' and sales agents' licenses.
(1) Any unlawful act or any violation of this chapter committed by any real estate sales agent or associate broker employed or engaged as an independent
contractor by or on behalf of a licensed principal broker or committed by any employee, officer, or member
of a licensed principal broker is cause for the revocation, suspension, or probation of the principal broke] 's license, or for the imposition of a fine against
the principal broker in an amount not to exceed $500
pez violation
(2) The revocation or suspension of a principal brokei license automatically inactivates every associate
broker or sales agent license granted to those persons
by reason of their affiliation with the principal broker
whose license was revoked, pending a change of brokei affiliation A principal broker shall, prior to the
effective date of the suspension or revocation of his
license, notify in writing every licensee affiliated
with him of the revocation or suspension of his license
1968
61-2-14. List of l i c e n s e e s to b e available.
The division shall make available at reasonable
cost a list of the names and addresses of all persons
licensed by it under this chapter
1989
61-2-15,61-2-16.

Repealed.

1*73

61-2-17. Penalty for violation of chapter.
(1) Any individual violating this chapter, in addition to being subject to a license sanction or a fine
ordered by the commission, is, upon conviction of a
first violation, guilty of a class A misdemeanor, any
imprisonment shall be for a term not to exceed six
months If the violator is a corporation, it is, upon
conviction of a first violation, guilty of a class A mis
demeanor Upon conviction of a second or subsequent

61-2-21

violation, an individual is guilty of a third degree
felony; imprisonment shall be for a term not to exceed
two years If a corporation is convicted of a second or
subsequent violation, it is guilty of a third degree
felony Any officer or agent of a corporation, or any
member or agent of a partnership or association, who
personally participates in or is an accessory to any
violation of this chapter by such corporation, partnership, or association, is subject to the penalties pre
scribed for individuals
(2) If any person receives any money or its equivalent, as commission, compensation, or profit by or in
consequence of a violation of this chapter, that person
is liable for an additional penalty of not less than the
amount of the money received and not more than
three times the amount of money received, as may be
determined by the court This penalty may be sued
for in any court of competent jurisdiction, and recovered by any person aggrieved for his own use and
benefit
(3) All fines imposed by the commission and the
executive director pursuant to this chapter shall be
deposited into the Real Estate Education, Research,
and Recovery Fund to be used in a manner consistent
with the requirements of the Real Estate Recovery
Fund Act
1986
61-2-18.

Actions for recovery of c o m p e n s a t i o n
restricted.
(1) No person may bring or maintain an action m
any court of this state for the recovery of a commission, fee, or compensation for any act done or service
rendered which is prohibited under this chapter to
other than licensed pnncipal brokers, unless the person was duly licensed as a pnncipal broker at the
time of the doing of the act or rendering the service
(2) No sales agent or associate broker may sue in
his own name for the recovery of a fee, commission, or
compensation for services as a sales agent or asso
ciate broker unless the action is against the principal
broker with whom he is or was licensed Any action
for the recovery of a fee, commission, or other compensation may only be instituted and brought by the
principal broker with whom the sales agent or associate broker is affiliated
1985
61-2-19.

Repealed.

1983

61-2-20.

Rights and privileges of sales agent, associate brokers, and principal brokers.
Real estate licensees may fill out those forms ap
proved by the Utah Real Estate Commission and the
attorney general and those forms provided by statute,
with the following exceptions
(1) Principal brokers and associate brokers
may fill out any documents associated with the
closing of a real estate transaction
(2) Real estate licensees may fill out real es
tate forms prepared by legal counsel of the buyer,
seller, lessor, or lessee, or any legal counsel, provided that the Real Estate Commission and attorney general have not approved a specific form
necessary to that transaction
1985
61-2-21. Remedies and action for violations.
(1) (a) If the director has reason to believe that
any person has been or is engaging in acts consti
tuting violations of this chapter, and if it appears
to the director that it would be in the public in
terest to stop such acts, he shall issue and serve
upon the person an order directing that person to
cease and desist from those acts

&TATIS AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the
petitioner is entitled to relief,
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and law and any
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings,
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial proceedings under this section.
1968
63-46b-16.

J u d i c i a l review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate
court in the form required by the appellate rules
of the appropriate appellate court
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings
and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure [Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court], except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of
law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed
to follow prescribed procedure;
(0 the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body
or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that dem-
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onstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
1868

63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or
compensation only to the extent expressly authorized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of
agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for
further proceedings.

(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court,
if authorized by statute.
1867
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other
temporary remedies pending final disposition.
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the
agency may grant a stay of its order or other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial review,
according to the agency's rules.
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention.
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies requested by a party, the agency's
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary
remedy was not granted.
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it
finds that:
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying
the stay; or
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is likely
to prevail on the merits when the court
finally disposes of the matter;
(ii) the party seeking judicial review will
suffer irreparable injury without immediate
relief;
(iii) granting relief to the party seeking
review will not substantially harm other
parties to the proceedings; and
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety,
or welfare relied upon by the agency is not
sufficiently serious to justify the agency's action under the circumstances.
1987
63-46b-19. Civil e n f o r c e m e n t
(1) (a) In addition to other remedies provided by
law, an agency may seek enforcement of an order
by seeking civil enforcement in the district
courts.
(b) The action seeking civil enforcement of an
agency's order must name, as defendants, each
alleged violator against whom the agency seeks
to obtain civil enforcement.
(c) Venue for an action seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order shall be determined by
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78-12-1.

Time for c o m m e n c e m e n t of actions
generally.
Civil actions may be commenced only within the
periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of
action has accrued, except in specific cases where a
different limitation is prescribed by statute.
1967
ARTICLE 1
REAL PROPERTY
78-12-2. Actions b y the state.
The state will not sue any person for or in respect to
any real property, or the issues or profits thereof, by
reason of the right or title of the state to the same,
unless:
(1) such right or title shall have accrued
within seven years before any action or other
proceeding for the same shall be commenced; or
(2) the state or those from whom it claims
shall have received the rents and profits of such
real property, or some part thereof, within seven
years.
lwu
78-12-3.

Actions b y p a t e n t e e s or g r a n t e e s from
state.
No action can be brought for or in respect to real
property by any person claiming under letters patent
or a grant from this state, unless the same might
have been commenced by the state as herein speci-
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fied, in case such patent had not been issued or grant
made.
IMS
78-12-4.

When letters p a t e n t o r grants declared
void.
When letters patent or grants of real property issued or made by the state are declared void by the
determination of a competent court, an action for the
recovery of the property so conveyed may be brought
either by the state, or by any subsequent patentee or
grantee of the property, his heirs or assigns, within
seven y e a n after such determination, but not after
that period.
IMS
78-12-5.

Seizure or p o s s e s s i o n within s e v e n
years necessary.
No action for the recovery of real property or for the
possession thereof shall be maintained, unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or predecessor was seized or possessed of the property in
question within seven years before the commencement of the action.
isss
78-12-5.1.

Seizure or p o s s e s s i o n within s e v e n
y e a r s — P r o v i s o — T a x title.
No action for the recovery of real property or for the
possession thereof shall be maintained, unless the
plaintiff or his predecessor was seized or possessed of
such property within seven years from the commencement of such action; provided, however, that with respect to actions or defenses brought or interposed for
the recovery or possession of or to quiet title or determine the ownership of real property against the
holder of a tax title to such property, no such action or
defense shall be commenced or interposed more than
four years after the date of the tax deed, conveyance,
or transfer creating such tax title unless the person
commencing or interposing such action or defense or
his predecessor has actually occupied or been in possession of such property within four years prior to the
commencement or interposition of such action or defense or within one year from the effective date of this
amendment.
iscs
78-12-5.2.

Holder of tax title — Limitations of
action or d e f e n s e — P r o v i s o .
No action or defense for the recovery or possession
of real property or to quiet title or determine the ownership thereof shall be commenced or interposed
against the holder of a tax title after the expiration of
four years from the date of the sale, conveyance or
transfer of such tax title to any county, or directly to
any other purchase thereof at any public or private
tax sale and after the expiration of one year from the
date of this act. Provided, however, that this section
shall not bar any action or defense by the owner of
the legal title to such property where he or his predecessor has actually occupied or been in actual possession of such property within four years from the commencement or interposition of such action or defense.
And provided further, that this section shall not bar
any defense by a city or town, to an action by the
holder of a tax title, to the effect that such city or
town holds a lien against such property which is
equal or superior to the claim of the holder of such tax
title.
INS
78-12-5.3. Definitions of "tax title" and "action.* 9
(1) The term "tax title" as used in Section
78-12-5.2 and Section 59-2-1364, and the related
amended Sections 78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12,
means any title to real property, whether valid or not,
which has been derived through or is dependent upon
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78-12-24. Actions against public officers —
Within six years.
An action by the state or any agency or public corporation thereof against any public officer for malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in office or
against any surety upon his official bond may be
brought within six years after such officer ceases to
hold his office, but not thereafter.
isss
78-12-26. Within four years.
Within four years:
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or
liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and
merchandise, and for any article charged on a
store account; also on an open account for work,
labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within
four years after the last charge is made or the
last payment is received.
(2) A claim for relief or a cause of action under
the following sections of Chapter 6, Title 25, the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in specific situations limits the time for action to
one year, under Section 25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1).
(3) An action for relief not otherwise provided
for by law.
isss
78-12-25.5. Injury due to defective design or
construction of improvement to real
property — Within seven years.
(1) (a) An action to recover damages for any injury
to property, real or personal, or for any injury to
the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death,
arising out of the defective and unsafe condition
of an improvement to real property, or any action
for damages sustained on account of the injury,
may not be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, surveying, supervising the construction of, or constructing the improvement to real property more than
seven years after the completion of construction.
(b) In an action regarding property boundary
surveys, the seven-year time period commences
when the property survey is either recorded in
the county recorder's office or filed in the county
surveyor's office under Section 17-23-17.
(2) The time limitation imposed by this section
does not apply to any person in actual possession and
control as owner, tenant, or otherwise, of the improvement at the time the defective and unsafe condition of the improvement constitutes the proximate
cause of the injury for which an action is brought.
(3) This section does not extend or limit the periods
otherwise prescribed by state law for the bringing of
any action.
(4) As used in this section:
(a) "Person" means an individual, corporation,
partnership, or other legal entity.
(b) "Completion of construction" means the
date of issuance of a certificate of substantial
completion by the owner, architect, engineer, or
other agent, or the date of the owner's use or
possession of the improvement on real property.
1068

78-12-26. Within three years.
Within three years:

78-12-29

(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or
injury to real property; except that when waste
or trespass is committed by means of underground works upon any mining claim, the cause
of action does not accrue until the discovery by
the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such
waste or trespass.
(2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring
personal property, including actions for specific
recovery thereof; except that in all cases where
the subject of the action is a domestic animal
usually included in the term "livestock," which
at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or
brand, if the animal strayed or was stolen from
the true owner without the owner's fault, the
cause does not accrue until the owner has actual
knowledge of such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession of the
animal by the defendant.
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud
or mistake; except that the cause of action in
such case does not accrue until the discovery by
the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the
fraud or mistake.
(4) An action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state.
(5) An action to enforce liability imposed by
Section 78-17-3, except that the cause of action
does not accrue until the aggrieved party knows
or reasonably should know of the harm suffered.
1986

78-12-27. Action against corporate stockholders
or directors.
Actions against directors or stockholders of a corporation to recover a penalty or forfeiture imposed, or to
enforce a liability created, by law must be brought
within three years after the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts upon which the penalty or
forfeiture attached, or the liability accrued, and in
case of actions against stockholders of a bank pursuant to levy of assessment to collect their statutory
liability, such actions must be brought within three
years after the levy of the assessment.
isss
78-12-28. Within two years.
Within two years, an action:
(1) against a marshal, sheriff, constable, or
other officer upon a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his official capacity, and in virtue
of his office, or by the omission of an official duty,
including the nonpayment of money collected
upon an execution; but this section does not apply to an action for an escape;
(2) for recovery damages for the death of one
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another;
or
(3) for injury to the personal rights of another
as a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. 1987
78-12-29. Within one year.
Within one year:
(1) An action for liability created by the statutes of a foreign state.
(2) An action upon a statute for a penalty or
forfeiture where the action is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except
when the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.
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(3) An action upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal action, for a forfeiture or
penalty to the state.
(4) An action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction.
(5) An action against a sheriff or other officer
for the escape of a prisoner arrested or imprisoned upon either civil or criminal process.
(6) An action against a municipal corporation
for damages or injuries to property caused by a
mob or riot.
(7) A claim for relief or a cause of action under
the following sections of Chapter 6, Title 25, the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(lXa), which in specific situations limits the time for action to
four years, under Section 25-6-10; or
(b) Subsection 25-6-6(2).
isss
78-12-30. Actions on claims against county, city
or town.
Actions on claims against a county, city or incorporated town, which have been rejected by the board of
county commissioners, city commissioners, city council or toard of trustees, as the case may be, must be
commenced within one year after the first rejection
thereof by such board of county or city commissioners, city council or board of trustees.
isss
78-12-31. Within six months.
Within six months:
An /action against an officer, or an officer de facto:
(1) to recover any goods, wares, merchandise
oi' other property seized by any such officer in his
official capacity as tax collector, or to recover the
price or value of any goods, wares, merchandise
or other personal property so seized, or for damages for the seizure, detention, sale of, or injury
to, any goods, wares, merchandise or other personal property seized, or for damages done to any
person or property in making any such seizure.
(2) for money paid to any such officer under
protest, or seized by such officer in his official
capacity, as a collector of taxes, and which, it is
claimed, ought to be refunded.
isss
78-12-31.1. H a b e a s corpus — Three months.
Within three months:
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus.
This limitation shall apply not only as to grounds
known to petitioner but also to grounds which in
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
been known by petitioner or counsel for petitioner.
1979

312

78-12-33. A c t i o n s b y state o r other governmental entity.
The limitations in this article apply to actions
brought in the name of or for the benefit of the state
or other governmental entity, the same as to actions
by private parties, except under Section 78-12-33.5.
1988

78-12-33.5. Statute of limitations — Asbestos
damages — Action by state or governmental entity.
(l)(a) No statute of limitations or repose may bar
an action by the state or other governmental entity to recover damages from any manufacturer
of any construction materials containing asbestos, when the action arises out of the manufacturer's providing the materials, directly or
though other persons, to the state or other governmental entity or to a contractor on behalf of
the state or other governmental entity.
(b) Subsection (a) provides for actions not yet
barred, and also acts retroactively to permit actions under this section that are otherwise
barred.
(2) As used in this section, "asbestos" means
asbestiform varieties of:
(a) chrysotile (serpentine);
(b) crocidolite (riebeckite);
(c) amosite (cummingtonite-grunerite);
(d) anthophyllite;
(e) tremolite; or
(f) actinolite.
isss
78-12-34. Repealed.

issi

ARTICLE 3
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
78-12-35. Effect of absence from state.
Where a cause of action accrues against a person
when he is out of the state, the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter
after his return to the state. If after a cause of action
accrues he departs from the state, the time of his
absence is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
1987
78-12-36. Effect of disability.
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than
for the recovery of real property, is at the time the
cause of action accrued, either under the age of majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal
guardian, the time of the disability is not a part of the
time limited for the commencement of the action.
1987

78-12-31.2. Post-conviction remedies — 30 days.
Within 30 days:
No post-conviction remedies may be applied for
or entertained by any court within 30 days prior
to the date set for execution of a capital sentence,
unless the grounds therefor are based on facts or
circumstances which developed or first became
known within that period.
1979
78-12-32. Action o n mutual account — When
d e e m e d accrued.
In an action brought to recover a balance due upon
a mutual, open and current account, where there
have been reciprocal demands between the parties,
the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued
from the time of the last item proved in the account
on either side.
isss

78-12-37. Effect of death.
If a person entitled to bring an action dies before
the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action survives, an
action may be commenced by his representatives after the expiration of that time and within one year
from his death. If a person against whom an action
may be brought dies before the expiration of the time
limited for the commencement thereof and the cause
of action survives, an action may be commenced
against the representatives after the expiration of
that time and within one year after the issue of letters testamentary or of administration.
1968
78-12-38. Effect of death of defendant outside
this state.
If a person against whom a cause of action exists
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5 May, 1982
Provo, Utah

re: The inherited items in the personal estate of Barbara Eiseniiand llomeyer
All items in the above mentioned estate are assigned for sale &/or cxctiangu
to the personal agent to Barbara Eisenhand Homcyer, Ms. Juaiita Taft Rogers.
Said agent, in the event Barbara Eiseniiand Homeyer's death occurs before
the entire estate is liquidated, will put the miftining funds into a trust
for the minor children: Gerald William Honuyer, born 8 January, 1970 and
Richard Edward Homeyer, b o m 21 September, 1972, to be given to them en
their eighteenth birthdays. Said trust is to be so established or designated
either by a court appointed trustee; a representative traa the Division of
Family Services; or a member of the existing Bishopric <S/or Stake Presidency.
JSai£ designated trust representative will make all decisions with the review
"and approval of Ms. Betxy Jean Ityrd, personal family representative.
Ihe existing personal residence of Barbara Eisenhand llomeyer is located at
3*+5 South m-50 East; Provo, Utah 9*601.

rMs. Uurbara bisunhond llonryor

,«

#**

^'

/J

T

Mj/^KiuiUta Taft l t o ^ r s - ^ u i U f ^ r
rited estate of M^^ilotDuy^r
11 Locust Lane
Provo, Utah 8MCh

.- -

tea*.

Ms.LBetty ^ah
J ^ B3yrd, Witifess
Ms.

Bae original of this docunent i s In the posession of Juanita Taft Rogers, agent
to Ms. Barbara Eisenhand Hooeyer.
cc:

Ms. Betty Jean fyrd; 386 South mjO East; Provo, Utah 8^601

DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
RICHARD M. MERCER, DIRECTOR
PO BOX 45802
160 EAST 300 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145
TELEPHONE: (801) 530-6747
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE REAL ESTATE COMMISSION
In the Matter of
JUANITA TAFT ROGERS to Act
as a Real Estate Principal Broker

PETITION
CASE NO. RE87-08-02

The Division of Real Estate of the Department of Business
Regulation of the State of Utah (the Division), by and through
Its Director, Richard M. Mercer, upon knowledge and belief, hereby
complains and alleges as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The cause of action was Investigated by the Division upon
complaints that Juanlta Taft Rogers (Rogers) has engaged In acts and
practices which constitute violations of Utah Code Annotated Section
61-2-1, et seq. (1953, as amended).
JURISDICTION
1.

Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 provides that the Utah

Real Estate Commission may suspend or revoke the Real Estate license of
any salesagent or broker who, while engaging In acts for which such a
license Is required, Is found guilty of:
a.

M

..*(6) Falling within a reasonable time, to account

for or to remit any monies coming Into his possession which belong to
others, or commingling those funds with his own, or diverting those
funds from the purpose for which they were received;b.

"..,(8) Being unworthy or Incompetent to act as a

principal broker, associate broker, or salesagent
safeguard the Interests of the public;"

In such manner as to

c.

"•..(15) Violating or disregarding this chapter, an order

of the Commission, or the Rules adopted by the Commission and the
Division.
d.
his principal
2.

"...(18) Breaching a fiduciary duty owed by a licensee to
In a real estate transaction.

Rogers Is a real estate principal broker duly licensed by the

State of Utah
3.

under License No. PB 14700.

At all times material to this action, Rogers was acting in her

capacity as a real estate licensee.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
4.

In January, 1982, Rogers was a salesagent affiliated with

principal broker David R. Harman.

On September 1, 1982, she terminated

her affiliation with Harman and became affiliated with principal
broker A.J. Michaels.

In late 1982 or early 1983, she terminated her

affiliation with Michaels and became affiliated with K.M. Wool ley &
Company.

Rogers' license was suspended from September 15, 1985 through

September 15, 1986, and placed on probation from September 15, 1986
through September 15, 1988, as a result of case #1737, which Involved
a 1981-1982 real estate transaction.

Rogers obtained a license as a

principal broker on January 15, 1987.
5.

In or about January, 1982, Homeyer and Rogers orally agreed

that Homeyer would give Rogers some Inherited personal property to
hold.

Rogers was to find a seller of a home

property Instead of cash for a down payment.

who would accept personal
If such a seller could

not be found, Rogers was to arrange for the sale of some of the
property to generate cash for a down payment.

If a sale was

consummated, Rogers would receive some of the personal property In an
amount equal to a 6% commission.
6.

During February and March, 1982, Homeyer delivered numerous

Items of personal property to Rogers, who stored It In two storage

units owned by a Mr. Miller.

Miller had listed the storage units for

sale with Rogers.
7.

A seller who was willing to take personal property was

not found.

On or about May 5, 1982, Homeyer gave Rogers written

authorization to liquidate the property.
8.

Rogers sold a number of Items for a total of $4,495.00 which

had a fair market value of $6,530.50.

Rogers did not deliver the sale

proceeds to her principal broker to hold In trust for Homeyer.

Rogers

gave possession of certain Items valued at $6,799.50 to various
Individuals with Instructions to repair, restore, or appraise the
Items.
9.

In or about July, 1982, Homeyer orally demanded that Rogers

give her the proceeds of the sales and return the balance of the
personal property which had not been sold.

In July, 1982 and on

October 29, 1982, Homeyer's attorneys demanded that Rogers return
all property still held, and account for all property which had been
transferred, sold, or disposed of by Rogers.

Rogers refused to comply

until ordered to do so by court order In July, 1986.
10.

Rogers did not turn over to Homeyer the $4,495.00 In proceeds

from the sale of Items, nor did she

retrieve the $6,799.50 worth of

items which had been given to others to repair, restore, or appraise.
In addition, Rogers still had In her possession or had otherwise
disposed of other Items valued at $4,820.50.
11.

On October 30, 1986, Homeyer obtained a Judgment In the

amount of $18,150.00 against Rogers based on conversion of personal
property and sale proceeds and on breach of fiduciary duty.

After the

Judgment was entered, Rogers converted her Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which
had been pending since 1981, to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

Homeyer has

filed a $10,000.00 claim against the Real Estate Recovery Fund.
COUNT I

12.

The Division realleges and Incorporates by reference Its

allegations set forth In paragraphs No. 1 through 11 as If spec I flea II;
set out herein.
13.

Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 (1953, as amended),

provides that a real estate license may be suspended or revoked If the
licensee Is found guilty of:

"...(6) Falling within a reasonable time,

to account for or to remit any monies coming Into his possession which
belong to others, or commingling those funds with his own, or diverting
those funds from the purpose for which they were received;"
14.

As outlined above, Rogers sold Items of personal property anc

received $4,495.00, which she did not remit to Homeyer or account for.
Rogers commingled the funds with her own and expended them.
15.

The above actlon(s) by Rogers constitute violation of Utah

Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 (6) as amended.
COUNT I I
16.

The Division realleges and Incorporates by reference Its

allegations set forth In paragraphs No. 1 through 15 as If specifically
set out herein.
17.

Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 (1953, as amended),

provides that a real estate license may be suspended or revoked If
licensee Is found guilty of: "...(8) Being unworthy or Incompetent
to act as a principal broker, associate broker, or salesagent In such
manner as to safeguard the Interests of the public;"
18.

As outlined above, Rogers received personal property

from Homeyer which was to be used In connection with a real estate
transaction, and failed to safeguard the property.
delivered to parties who did not return them.
Rogers or otherwise dissipated.
below market value.

Additional

Numerous Items were

Other Items were kept by

Items were sold by Rogers

Rogers did not give the sales proceeds to her

principal broker to hold In trust or to Homeyer.

19.

The above actlon(s) by Rogers constitute violation of Utah

Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 (8) as amended.
COUNT I I i
20.

The Division realleges and Incorporates by reference Its

allegations set forth In paragraphs No. 1 through 19 as if specifically
set out herein.
21.

Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 (1953, as amended),

provides that a real estate license may be suspended or revoked If the
licensee is found guilty of:
by a licensee to his principal
22.

"...(16) Breaching a fiduciary duty owed
In a real estate transaction."

As outlined above, Homeyer entrusted Rogers with personal

property In connection with a proposed real estate transaction.

Rogers

failed to protect the property, and refused to return It to Homeyer
when requested to do so.

Rogers sold a number of Items at below market

value and kept the proceeds.
23.

The above actlon(s) by Rogers constitute violation of Utah

Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 (16) as amended.
COUNT IV
24.

The Division realleges and Incorporates by reference Its

allegations set forth In paragraphs No. 1 through 23 as If specifically
set out herein.
26.

Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 (1953, as amended),

provides that a real estate license may be suspended or revoked If
the licensee Is found guilty of:

"...(15) Violating or disregarding

this chapter, an Order of the Commission, or the Rules adopted by the
Commission and the Division."
26.

Rule 4.2, adopted pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 5.5

(1953, as amended), requires that all funds received by a licensee In
a real estate transaction must be delivered to the principal broker and
deposited

In the broker's trust account within three banking days.

27.

As outlined above, Rogers sold Homeyer's personal property

to generate funds for a down payment on a real estate purchase, but dl
not deliver the proceeds to her principal broker for deposit Into the
broker's real estate trust account.
28.

The above actlon(s) by Rogers constitute violation of Rule

4.2 and Utah Code Annotated Section 61-2-11 (15) as amended.
WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief:
1.

That Rogers be adjudged and decreed to have engaged In the

acts alleged herein.
2.

That by engaging In the above acts, Rogers be adjudged and

decreed to be guilty of the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section
61-2-11 (6), (8), (16), and (16) (1953, as amended).
3.

That Rogers license to act as a real estate licensee be

suspended or revoked accordingly.
DATED this

^J7

A/0~ZLf<4e4&6'

day of

1987.
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RICHARD M. MERCER, DIRECTOR
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Appeared before me this

25ffc^

day of

NCrue/rylofc^*

1987,

, who deposes and says that the Information listed above Is true to the
best of his knowledge and belief.

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

fr.yqi
Res I d I ng a t : ^Jit

{JJ&L.

U+y. , UUfrUL^
MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing
document upon Juanlta Taft rogers by mailing a copy thereof, properly

addressed, wifh nrt«4-»«^ .«...-.-.-t->

*--

—-

A copy of the foregoing document has been mailed this day prepaid
to Gary Weight, attorney for Juanlta Taft Rogers, at Aldrlch, Nelson,
Weight & Esplln, P.O. Box L, Provo, Utah 84603.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah this

L

clay of

1987.

A—7.
TIIDP
SIGNATURE

SKW87-08-02-P
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BEFORE THE REAL ESTATE DIVISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the matter of the license of Joanita Taft Rogers
to act as a Real Estate Principal Broker

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
CaseNo.RE-87-08-02

Appearances:
Sheila Page for the Division of Real Estate
Gary H. Weight for Respondent
By the Administrative Law Judge:
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on September 20,1988 before J. Steven
Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for theDepartment of Business Regulation. Thereafter, certain
preliminary motions were presented by respective counseL
Based thereon, Counts I and HI act forth in the Petition, dated November 25,1987, were dismissed,
Further, Count IV was amended to reflect die rule to be properly designated therein. Respondent's motions
to dismiss the insert, proceeding on the basis that the hearing should be conducted by the Commission
rather than the Administrative Law Judge and that the Division should be estopped to take any action on
Respondent's license were denied
Thereafter, evidence was offered and received The Administrative Law Judge, being fully in the
premises, now enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Sometime in 1973, Respondent became licensed as a sales agent by the Division of Real
Estate. As relevant herein, Respondent was affiliated with prindpal broker David R. Hannan as of January
1982. On September 1,1982, she terminated her affiliation with Mr. Hannan and became affiliated with
principal broker A. J. Michaels. In late 1982 or early 1983, she tenninated ber affiliation with Mr.
Michaels and became affiliated with K. M. Woolley & Company.

2. By Order, dated August 17,1983, Respondent's license was suspended for one year and
thereafter placed on probation for two years, subject to certain terms and conditions. Said order was based
on conduct which occurred between December 10,1981 and August 22,1982. Respondent's conduct in that
regard was found to constitute gross incompetence and a violation of diefiduciaryduty owed to h a clients
in that transaction. Respondent subsequently became licensed as a principal broker on January 15,1987.
3. In January 1982, a Barbara Homeyer contacted Respondent to obtain her services in purchasing
a home. Ms. Homeyer, who was recently divorced,residedin a home jointly owned by herself and her exhusband. Since there had been no property settlementrelativeto her divorce and Ms. Homeyer's ex-husband
was reluctant to cooperate as to the sale of their home, the only assets available to Ms. Homeyer to provide
a down payment on the purchase of another home consisted of various items of inherited personal property.
4. During January 1982, Ms. Homeyer and Respondent entered into a verbal agreement, whereby
Respondent was to act as Ms. Homeyer's real estate agent and attempt to find a prospective seller who
would accept Ms. Homeyer's personal property as down payment for the purchase of a home. On February
21 f 1982, Respondent and Ms. Homeyer inventoried her property. Ms. Homeyer then delivered that
property to Respondent, which was held in storage under Respondent's control. The property was so
transferred to Respondent as the means to provide a safe place for its storage and facilitate Respondent's
access to that property if a prospective seller was located.
5. Between February and late-April 1982, Respondent and Ms. Homeyer identified at least two
properties for possible purchase. In one instance, an agreement could not be reached as to those items of
Ms. Homeyer's personal property which wouM be a c ^

When it

became apparent to Ms. Homeyer that no other purchase on the above-described terms would be realized, she
authorized Respondent to sell certain items as the means to provide cash for die down payment necessary to
purchase a home.
6. During March and April 1982, Respondent had some of Ms. Homeyer's property appraised and
certain items were sold in antique shows. However, as of late April 1982, no progress in locating a
suitable home had been realized, Ms. Homeyer hadreceivedno monies from Respondent relative to the sale
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of some of her property and Respondent had taken certain property from storage and sold it without Ms.
Homeyer*s authorization. Further, Respondent never advised her principal broker of her activities nor did
she deliver to him any of the funds she obtained from the sale of Ms. Homeyer's property.
7. In late-April or early May 1982, Ms. Homeyer underwent foot surgery and was advised that her
condition could be cancerous. At the time, it was unknown if a suitable home would be found and whether
that would occur prior to her possible death. On May 5,1982, Ms. Homeyer met with Respondent and
they executed a written agreement, whereby the former assigned all of her personal property to Respondent
for sale and/or exchange and authorized Respondent to liquidate that property. The agreement further
provided that if all property held by Respondent was not liquidated prior to Ms. Homeyer's death, the
remaining funds would be placed in trust for the benefit of her two minor children.
8. During the next two months, Ms. Homeyer was never advised as to the status of her property
and was unable to contaa Respondent in thatregard.In mid-July 1982, Ms. Homeyer retained counsel and
made written demand that Respondentreturnall personal property in her possession and provide an
accounting as to the sale or other disposition of the remaining property which had been in her possession.
9. By letter, dated October 21,1982, Respondent generally informed Ms. Homeyer as to efforts
which had been undertaken to appraise, restore and/or sell some of the property in her possession.
Respondent further mentioned various costs incurred as to the appraisal and restoration of that property.
Respondent alsoreiteratedthat her efforts had been undertaken to produce funds necessary for a down
payment for a home or condominium, but she acknowledged that no suitable residence had yet been
identified. RespondentrequestedMs. Homeyer to keep her posted "about what you want to do with the
housing thing** and she advised Ms. Homeyer of a listing for a two bedroom townhouse duplex and pondered
that Ms. Homeyer could live in one side andrentthe other.
10. By letter, dated October 28,1982, Ms. Homeyer advised Respondent that purchase of the
duplex would not be economically feasible andreiteratedthat no accounting had been received as to the
status of her property or any disposition thereof. By letter, dated October 29,1982, a second demand was
made that Respondent return all items of personal property entrusted to her. When compliance with that
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demand was not forthcoming, Ms. Homeyer initiated litigation. No accounting was provided to Ms.
Homeyer until July 9,1986, when Respondent returned certain items pursuant to a writ of replevin.
11. By Stipulation, dated October 7,1986, Ms. Homeyer and Respondent identified the status of
some of the property which had been in Respondent's possession. That property consisted of guns,
cameras, furs, clocks and watches, a coin coUectin, sU
household and other miscellaneous items. The value of the property which Respondent sold was agreed to
have been $6,530.30 and Respondent received $4,495.00 from the sale of that property. It was agreed that
certain property, valued at $6,79930, was delivered by Respondent to third parties and that said property had
not been recovered by Ms. Homeyer. It was also agreed that certain property still in Respondent's
possession should be valued at $4,82030.
12. Some of the property which Ms. Homeyer had delivered to Respondent was subsequently
returned to her. However, in Fmdings of Faa and Conclusions of Law, dated October 30,1986, the Court
concluded that Respondent had sold some of the property below fair market value, had interfered with Ms.
Homeyers possession and control of some of the property by intentionally refusing toreturnit and had
converted the proceeds from the sale of some of the property to her own use. By reason thereof, the Court
entered judgment on October 30,1986 in favor of Ms. Homeyer totalling $2,035.50 as a result of
Respondent's breach of contractual andfiduciaryduties to Ms. Homeyer, $4,495.00 as aresultof
Respondent's conversion of proceeds from the sale of the property, $6,799.50 as aresultof Respondent's
conversion of property upon transferring that property to others and $4,820.50 as aresultof Respondent's
conversion of property still in her possession.
13. In the above-referenced Findings ofFact, the Court also noted that Ms. Homeyer had initiated
bankruptcy preoceedings on July 22,1985 and that Respondent had been listed as a creditor in said
proceedings. The Counfurther noted that an order was entered in those proceedings on October 30,1985,
whereby Ms. Homeyer was discharged of all claims, including those of Respondent relative to expenses she
incurred in her efforts torepair,restoreand dispose of Ms. Homeyers property. The instantrecordalso
reflects that Respondent initiated bankruptcy proceedings in 1981 and that after entry of the October 30,
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1986 Judgment, an order was entered in those bankmpty proceedings relative to Respondent, whereby the
just-stated Judgment was discharged.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondent urges that her May 5,1982 agreement with Ms. Homeyer terminated the real estate
agem^rincipal relationship which had previously existed between them. Respondent further asserts that her
subsequent conduct pursuant to that contract had no relevance respecting her status as a licensed sales agent
and provides no basis upon which to enter a sanction as to that licensure. Respondent further urges that
there is no proper basis to now conclude she is incompetent or unworthy to practice as a principal broker,
inasmuch as whatever occurred prior to May 5,1982 does not reflect either a continuing or presently
existing pattern of misconduct
Section 61-2-119 Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, provides that a real estate license may
be suspended or revoked if the licensee is found guilty of :
(8)

being unworthy or incompetent to act as a principal broker, associated broker, or
sales agent in such manner as to safeguard the interests of the public;
• ****
(IS) violating or disregarding this chapter, an order of the commission, or the rules
adopted by the commission and the division.
Rule 9(a)(7) further provides:
All consideration received by a salesman in connection with a real estate transaction
in which he is engaged on behalf of his broker shall immediately be delivered by him to his
broker
Upon a considered review of the conflicting evidence presented. Respondents assertion that the
May 5,1982 agreement transformed what had been a real estate transaction between a principal and an agent
to that of a contract between private parties is not well founded. The May 5,1982 agreement does not
reference the previously existing relationship between Ms. Homeyer and Respondent and, importantly, does
not explicitly tever or alter that relationship. If it were Respondent's intent to effect a shift in her existing
relationship with Ms. Homeyer, it was incumbent upon Respondent to utilize language clearly reflective of
that intent, particularly when Respondent had come into possession of Ms. Homeyer s property as her agent
in a real estate transaction, Respondent had already disposed of some of that property, and it was anticipated
that she would retain possession of the remaining property with the written authorization to liquidate it
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Nothing in the May 5,1986 agreement reflects that Ms. Homeyer no longer desired to obtain
another home or that Respondent would no longer attempt to locate a home for Ms. Homeyer.
Significantly, Respondent's efforts in thatregarddid not cease after that agreement was executed. To the
contrary. Respondent acknowledged in her subsequent correspondence with Ms. Homeyer that continuing
efforts to locate a home had been made. As of October 21,1982, possibilities in thatregardwere still
being explored. Simply put, the May 5, 1982 agreement did not change the relationship between Ms.
Homeyer and Respondent as itrelatesto the purpose for which possession of Ms. Homeyer's property was
initially transferred to Respondent Thus, the manner in which Respondent disposed of that property is a
matter properly congizable by the Commission as to whether any basis exists to enter a sanction on
Respondent's licensure as a real estate principal broker.
Concededly, the transaction underreviewoccurred approximately six years ago and there is no
evidence that Respondent has engaged in any misconduct since that time. Nevertheless, a violation of
Section 61-2-11(8) may be established upon sufficient evidence of aggravated misconduct by a licensee
during the course of a single real estate transaction. The instantrecordclearly reflects that Respondent held,
sold or otherwise disposed of Ms. Homeyer's property in a manner entirely inconsistent with Ms.
Homeyer's interest in that property. In certain instances. Respondent acted without authorization from Ms.
Homeyer and failed to safeguard the latter's interest in the property which had been entrusted to her.
Although Respondent's conduct was not governed by an statutorily mandated fiduciary duty between herself
and Ms. Homeyer, Respondent clearly owed such a duty as a sales agent to Ms. Homeyer throughout the
time under review and she M e d to properly discharge that duty.
In addition to Respondent's breach of thefiduciaryduty which she owed to Ms. Homeyer,
Respondent failed to deliver to her principal broker the consideration she received from die sale of Ms.
Homeyer's property. Thus, Respondent violated Section 61-2-11(15) and Rule 9(a)(7) relative thereto.
Furthermore, Respondent knew that she had been given the only assets available to Ms. Homeyer which
could be used to effect the purchase of another home. Without explanation, Respondent failed to account
for those assets whenrepeatedrequeststo do so had been made between July 1982 and October 1982, yet

6

she ostensibly held herself out to Ms. Homeyer as being willing to continue to assist in the search for a
home.
Arguably, the agreement between Ms. Homeyer and Respondent was somewhat unique and
Respondent may have engaged in relatively unconventional efforts in her attempt to obtain a home for Ms.
Homeyer. Respondent may also have encountered unforeseen difficulties in liquidating the property to
generate cash and in her on-going relationship with Ms. Homeyer. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
Respondent should have consistently acted in Ms. Homeyer's best interests and there is simply no evidence
that she did so. To the contrary, the egregious nature of Respondent's misconduct operated to produce
substantial financial harm to Ms. Homeyer. Based thereon, and given the disciplinary sanction which was
entered in 1983, an appropriately severe sanction should now enter as to Respondent's licensure.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's license to practice as a real estate principal
broker be revoked, said revocation to become effective consistent with the provisions of Section 61-212(1X0.
Dated this,

of December, 1988.
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ORDER
The foregoing Findings
Recommended

Order

are

of

Fact,

Conclusions

accepted as written.

ordered that the Utah real estate license

of

of

Law

It Is hereby
Juanlta

Taft

Rogers will be revoked effective February 14, 1989.
Dated this

K-+K day of

kgCiL«y\h£r-

1988.

UTAH REAL ESTATE/COMMISSION

MA

s^cca

FREDRICK FROERER, I I I

fnJltZf^kAn^^

WILLVAM H. COLEMAN

PAUL NEUEfsTStHWANDER
The above Order
undersigned this \ S

Is confirmed
day of y w ^ ^

and

QtJ
approved
f 1988*

by

WILLIAM E. DUNN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION

the

